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Introduction
For many Papua New Guineans, the dominant 
accounts of ‘the economy’ — contained within 
development reports, government documents, 
and the media — do not adequately reflect their 
experiences of making a living. Large-scale resource 
extraction — fronted by the PNG LNG (Papua 
New Guinea liquefied natural gas) project — as 
well as the private sector, export cash cropping, and 
wage employment have dominated these accounts. 
Meanwhile, the broader economic picture has 
remained obscured, as the diversity of economic 
practices, including subsistence production, 
non-monetary and non-market exchange, and a 
flourishing ‘informal’ economy have routinely been 
overlooked and undervalued (Gibson-Graham 
2006). Addressing this gap, this paper provides 
some grounded examples of the diverse livelihood 
strategies people employ in PNG’s growing 
urban centres, which house around 13 per cent 
of the country’s people (PNGSO 2003). Greater 
recognition of the diversity of rural livelihoods is 
also important, although beyond the scope of this 
paper. Understanding the diverse ways in which 
‘ordinary’ Papua New Guineans make a living is an 
important starting point for considering how the 
benefits of significant economic growth, currently 
being driven by the resource sector, may be 
distributed more equitably and contribute to more 
inclusive human development (UNDP 2014).
In our account of making a living in PNG, the 
‘formal’ and the ‘informal’ emerge as central con-
cepts. ‘Formal’ is a reference to the presence of 
state-based (and sometimes corporate) regulation, 
control and taxation, the enumeration of the activ-
ity, the regularity of work and pay, and often the 
(large) scale of the enterprise. This visibility to the 
state contributes to naturalising the formal as the 
economy of significance. By contrast, ‘informality’ 
is most often defined by what it is not — becoming 
an imperfect ‘catch-all’ for a heterogeneous array 
of activities that are broadly untaxed, unregulated 
(or minimally regulated) by the state, and which do 
not feature in government statistics or calculations 
of gross domestic product (Conroy 2010; Latouche 
1993; Williams and Round 2007). 
The reality is much messier, whether in PNG 
or elsewhere, and, as a result, the utility of these 
concepts is debated (Hart 2010). Nevertheless, these 
concepts have continued currency amongst the 
development community, government bureaucrats, 
and the ‘grassroots’— the self-identifying label of 
‘ordinary’ Papua New Guineans. Waged employ-
ment and the fortnightly pay cycle are key reference 
points in people’s economic lives, shaping their 
aspirations, spending patterns and identities. Papua 
New Guineans regularly juxtapose those who receive 
a wage with, as one betel nut seller put it, those who 
rely on the informal economy ‘13 days a fortnight’. 
Although formality also encompasses self-
employment ‘visible’ to the state, by and large 
formality, for most Papua New Guineans, means 
wage employment. This can be seen in the 2009–10 
PNG Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 
in which 36.5 per cent of working-age people sur-
veyed in the capital, Port Moresby, reported to have 
a waged job, while only 2.4 per cent reported to 
have a formal business (Gibson 2013, 10). In this 
survey, 16.5 per cent reported to be engaged in the 
informal sector, and 43.6 per cent to be not in the 
labour force. These figures conceal significant gen-
dered differences. Men are twice as likely as women 
to have wage employment, in both the capital and 
in other urban centres. By con-
trast, women are more prominent 
in the informal economy, double 
the participation of men in Port 
Moresby, and triple men’s participa-
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tion in other centres. More than four times as many 
men reported wage employment as compared to 
those reporting an informal income. In contrast, 
for women, informal livelihoods were as or more 
important than a wage (Gibson 2013, 10).
Formal and informal are also concepts that 
frame government policy and legislation — for 
example, the National Informal Economy Policy 
2011–2015 (PNGNEC 2011), and the Informal Sec- 
tor Development and Control Act 2004 (ISPNG 2004) 
and pervade global economic development discourse 
more broadly. These concepts are also pervasive in 
imaginings by the practitioners, bureaucrats, and 
grassroots alike of economic and material security, 
and, conversely, of precarity — in our case, liveli-
hoods characterised by unpredictability and insecurity.
The formal–informal divide becomes particularly 
problematic when the concepts are positioned in a 
hierarchy — that is, when one (formal) becomes val-
ued as a more desirable or appropriate mode of eco-
nomic organisation, modelled on an idealised vision 
of economies in the West (Carrier 1992; Gibson-
Graham 2006). This hierarchy also implies an inevi-
table, or desirable, trajectory from one to the other, 
such that informal economic activities become per-
ceived as nascent formal enterprises. Alternatively, as 
is disturbingly common in PNG, informal economic 
activity and the places where it occurs may be imag-
ined as illegal or criminal. For example, roadside 
markets are often accused of harbouring petty crimi-
nals, and vendors are routinely harassed by police. 
In this paper, we consider the questions recently 
posed by Narotzky and Besnier (2014, s5): ‘How do 
ordinary people’s experiences shape the livelihood 
projects that they undertake?’ and ‘How do material, 
social and cultural realities constrain these projects?’ 
Our focus is on the urban experience of Melanesians 
— an experience often characterised by its precarity 
and insecurity. We examine the ideas and strategies 
that people draw upon to sustain themselves materi-
ally, and focus on how people acquire and recircu-
late money. We reveal the interconnections between 
a diverse range of economic activities, both formal 
and informal (Cross 2010; Krige 2011). In doing 
so, we contribute to a substantial body of literature 
by anthropologists and human geographers that 
examines the interactions between various modes 
of economic activity in PNG, and which emphasises 
the intimate entangling of ‘social’ and ‘economic’ 
concerns (Akin and Robbins 1999; Bourke and Har-
wood 2009; Brookfield 1969; Carrier and Carrier 
1989; Curry 2003; Curry et al. 2012; Gregory 1982; 
Macintyre 2011; McCormack and Barclay 2013).
Each of us has adopted an ethnographic 
approach to these questions. Our work is informed 
by observations of people’s daily lives, and conver-
sations with security guards (Stephanie Lusby), the 
salaried middle class (John Cox), women entrepre-
neurs (Ceridwen Spark), residents from the urban 
settlements (Michelle Rooney) and betel nut traders 
and vendors (Timothy Sharp).1 
Collectively, our work takes an urban focus, yet 
the flows and connectivity between urban and rural, 
and our focus on livelihood strategies, means much 
of our discussion is also relevant to rural people and 
places. Our examples, drawn from urban centres 
throughout the country, each in their own way illus-
trate something of the diversity of economic activity 
in urban PNG (without attempting to be compre-
hensive in scope). Our material captures the inno-
vation and experimentation of people’s responses to 
precarity in contemporary PNG.
Security and Precarity
In this section, we concentrate on how entry-
level security guards make and negotiate social 
and economic value in their working lives. 
Security guards are the engine of an industry 
that exists in large part to protect the interests 
of the private sector and, therefore, the formal 
economy. However, many guards’ experiences are 
underpinned by uncertainty, underemployment, 
and insecurity living in town, combined with 
atrophied social ties and land access in their 
villages. We see here how the owner of a security 
company tried to assist his employees to negotiate 
this terrain by dividing their working fortnight 
very literally between ‘formal,’ urban-based waged 
employment and ‘informal’ activities in their 
villages. However, rather than allowing flexibility 
and choice, for many guards, the imposition of 
fixed demarcations of where and when formal and 
informal economic activities took place in fact 
increased their sense of personal insecurity.
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The private security industry in PNG has ben-
efited from the resource boom. Although the pres-
ence of security guards has been a familiar sight in 
PNG for decades, there has been a marked growth 
in the number and size of security firms in recent 
years (Security Industries Authority 2014). A grow-
ing formal economy, combined with feared and 
actual crime have created a lucrative business envi-
ronment (Lakhani and Willman 2014). By Decem-
ber 2013, 470 registered security companies were 
employing more than 24,000 ‘permitted guards’. 
In a formal economy that employs approximately 
350,000 people (Asian Development Bank 2014), 
these figures are significant, and probably underes-
timate actual numbers. Not all companies or guards 
register, and the Security Industries Authority does 
not have the staff or financial capacity to accurately 
monitor industry operations across the country.
The security industry reflects a hierarchy of 
social class and economic privilege in PNG. At 
the top are the executives of international security 
giants such as G4S — which claims to be the biggest 
player in the growing market for private security 
in PNG (G4S 2014) — and the CEOs and owners 
of large local firms. Highly paid expatriate ‘secu-
rity experts’ manage operations, overseeing local 
middle-class operations managers, who, like the 
women entrepreneurs and betel nut merchants dis-
cussed later in this paper, left jobs in other indus-
tries because they saw opportunities for better pay 
as skilled workers in a growth sector.
At the bottom of the chain of command are 
the rank-and-file guards, who are common fixtures 
across urban areas and throughout PNG’s resource 
enclaves. Employment as a security guard presents 
one of few options for men with little or no formal 
education, but wages are barely enough to sustain 
their families. Security guards are also exposed to 
violence as a routine part of their work, including 
disciplinary beatings for breaches of the rules (Lusby 
2014). The following considers how minimum-waged 
guards make a living while negotiating overlaps and 
entanglements between formal and informal econo-
mies. To do so, we draw on stories shared by guards 
working for Banis Inc. — a mid-tier, locally owned 
security company based in East New Britain.2
Split Rosters and Social Responsibility
At the time the research took place, Banis Inc. had 
approximately 300 employees (including adminis-
trative staff). Michael, the owner of the business, 
structured the guards’ rosters in alternating weeks 
so that they could work one week in town, and the 
following week in their home villages. On the weeks 
they were rostered to work, the guards lived at the 
company barracks in Kokopo, unless they were 
posted to other locations around the Gazelle Pen-
insula. On Wednesdays, the guards would change 
over, meeting together in the afternoon for ‘pay 
parade’ — they were paid on the same day as shifts 
changed over. Cash shortfalls meant that lending in 
the workplace was common. After receiving their 
pay, guards would repay any money that they had 
borrowed during their stay in town, and then find 
their own transport back to their home villages.
For Michael, there were considerable benefits 
of operating this way. By having the guards living 
in barracks, they were available to be picked up by 
company transport and taken to client locations at 
the start of each of the three daily eight-hour shifts 
— at 6am, 2pm and 10pm — and be returned to 
barracks to rest when the shift was over. Prohibi-
tively high housing costs and land scarcity meant 
that few people employed in Kokopo also lived in 
town; it could take an hour or more for some of the 
guards to get from their homes into the barracks. 
By providing accommodation, Michael solved a 
potential logistical issue that could have impacted 
upon the reliability of staff and, therefore, his busi-
ness reputation. Further, by having split fortnights, 
he was able to employ more guards than he could if 
his staff worked full time.
Michael also couched his justification for this 
business model in terms of his altruistic intent, 
describing it as fitting with local ways of life. He 
noted the importance of village life, relational ties 
and maintaining different income streams for most 
Papua New Guineans, and described week on/week 
off shifts as a deliberate means of facilitating this 
for his staff. His rationale for this was that guards 
would be able to remain in formal employment 
and also have scope and time to contribute to 
family and community activities, including small-
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scale income-generating projects such as market 
gardens, and copra and cocoa production. Michael 
proudly described this as a locally appropriate 
way of doing business because it recognised that 
people’s lives are shaped by a range of social and 
economic factors. Indeed, Michael’s arrangements 
for locating his workers in the village reflects a long 
tradition of Melanesian elites defining the proper 
lifestyles of the poor as rural and denying them a 
legitimate place in the urban economy (Gewertz 
and Errington 1999; Hau’ofa 1987).
Being a Guard: Underemployment, Workplace 
Credit, and Dissatisfaction
As we argue throughout this paper, people’s lives 
are not organised into separate domains of formal-
ity and informality, but are woven together through 
creative solutions that are predicated on shoring 
up everyday security. For some of these guards, the 
company’s construction of the boundaries of formal-
ity and informality meant precarity rather than flex-
ibility (cf. Kanngieser 2013; Waite 2009). There were 
two key issues with the week on/week off model 
for the guards. The first was the assumption that 
everyone had access to land from which they could 
make money or a subsistence living. The second was 
the lack of recognition that, for some guards, social 
relations within the workplace were as, if not more, 
important for exchanges of money and social sup-
port as relationships with people in the village. 
Many guards agreed that life was easier outside 
urban areas. Food and shelter were more acces-
sible, and there were fewer drains on resources in 
terms of the cost of living and access to ‘tempta-
tions’ such as alcohol. But guards also spoke about 
their difficulties accessing land to cultivate and 
to support themselves and their families. Even 
those who could make claims on customary ten-
ure experienced difficulties accessing land. Con-
versations about land shortages across the Gazelle 
Peninsula are not new (Martin 2013; Regan 1997), 
but, according to the guards, these have become 
increasingly contentious due to population growth, 
low commodity prices, and declining income from 
cocoa (associated with the recent introduction of 
the Cocoa Pod Borer, which has devastated cocoa 
production in East New Britain).
The guards from outside East New Britain Prov-
ince had limited access to income-generating oppor-
tunities outside town. They had moved to look for 
work, but were unable to find full-time employment. 
Some guards talked about trying to find work with 
other companies who could give them more hours 
and better conditions. Others talked about wanting 
to earn money to enable their return to education; 
they had dreams of achieving professional qualifica-
tions so as to make an urban-based life feasible, but 
had been forced out from schooling because of their 
families’ inability to pay school fees.
As underemployed security guards, those who 
were disenfranchised from land or non-urban 
livelihoods engaged in money-making schemes 
within their work social group. These included 
lending money to peers, and gambling in an attempt 
to supplement their incomes. Guards negotiated 
their own income shortfalls, creatively scraping 
out a living for themselves and drawing on social 
networks where they could. As we make clear in 
the next section, this precarious juggling of formal 
and informal ways of making a living characterises 
middle-class lives as well as those at the ‘bottom of 
the pyramid’ in PNG.
Social and Economic Pyramids
If security guards are near the bottom of PNG’s 
economic pyramid, middle-class Papua New Guin-
eans are often imagined to be somewhere near the 
top, enjoying the advantages of the formal econo-
my. They are frequently rendered as the ‘elites’ who 
monopolise access to jobs and services, particu-
larly education. Yet rising costs of living, increasing 
expectations of lifestyle, and, at times, the oner-
ous expectations of kin, no longer provide for the 
comfortable urban life remembered by a previous 
generation of ‘urban elites’. Many feel that they are 
struggling financially. This ‘downward mobility’ is 
reflected in the contemporary designation ‘work-
ing class’ that middle-class salary earners use of 
themselves (Cox 2014a). In the face of these dif-
ficulties, working-class Papua New Guineans have 
deployed a vast spread of strategies to make a liv-
ing. These may include small sideline businesses 
such as selling betel nut, opening trade stores or 
sewing clothes, which we discuss below. They also 
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involve a variety of ways of juggling money that 
encompass ‘payday lenders’, investing in ‘fast money 
schemes’ (Cox 2011, 2013, 2014c), or attempting to 
supplement their income by joining pyramid selling 
schemes (cf. Krige 2011). The prevalence of such 
practices in part reflects the challenges many Papua 
New Guineans face in accessing money through 
formal financial institutions. It is also a feature of 
the declining value of wages against the high costs 
of living in urban PNG, and the ongoing demands 
on middle-class incomes from extended kin (Mon-
sell-Davis 1993). 
Fast money scams, multi-level marketing, and 
the microfinance programs of Personal Viability 
alike are driven by informal personal networks, yet 
have the appearance of being more formally struc-
tured like banks or businesses. It is this accessibility 
that makes them appear more sympathetic to the 
plight of the common person than the commer-
cial banks, and which gives these schemes an air 
of moral authority (Cox 2011, 2013). They reflect 
enough formality to be perceived as legitimate but 
enough informality that they remain accessible. 
Moreover, they draw on similar visions of prosper-
ity and present themselves as a reliable route out of 
poverty. The Bank of Papua New Guinea seems to 
recognise this affinity and warns against fast money 
schemes when launching their own microfinance 
initiatives (e.g. Matbob 2010). 
Payday Lenders
The search for money by urban Papua New Guin-
eans has been accompanied by the ongoing laments 
in popular discussion and the media about payday 
lenders — the money lenders described by Goddard 
(2005), not the informal and rather benign loans 
among friends and relatives documented by Strath-
ern (1975). Tens of thousands of public servants 
have found themselves indebted to these lenders:
… Chief Secretary Isaac Lupari … told parlia-
mentarians … that 80 per cent of the 76,000 
public servants survived on borrowed money. 
… He said many of them had borrowed 
money from three to five different finance 
companies which charged interest rates rang-
ing from 25 to 50 per cent. Mr Lupari said as 
a result of high loan repayments, ‘the net pay 
some of them take home each fortnight on 
average is K50 or none’ (Palme 2007). 
It is common for payday lenders to charge 10 
per cent per fortnight and to add a further 10 per 
cent for each fortnight that the loan continues to 
be outstanding (Goddard 2005). Others charge a 
flat 30–40 per cent premium on the entire sum of 
the loan. Repayment of such loans is difficult and 
can trap borrowers in cycles of recurring debts. For 
both commercial banks and payday lenders, high 
interest rates reflect high risks of default, particu-
larly with larger sums of money that cannot simply 
be collected from fortnight to fortnight.
Fast Money Schemes
Fast money schemes are a perennial problem in 
PNG that has recently resurfaced (Radio Australia 
2015). Australian pyramid scams operated there 
during the colonial era (Stent 1977), but in more 
recent times a much larger rush of fast money 
schemes has swept through Port Moresby, the 
other urban centres, and out into rural areas. These 
scams, such as U-Vistract and its sister scheme 
Money Rain, promised their investors ludicrously 
high returns on their ‘investments’ (typically 100 per 
cent per month) and often spread through church 
networks, especially the large Pentecostal congrega-
tions of Port Moresby (Bainton and Cox 2009; Cox 
2011, 2013, 2014c; Cox and Macintyre 2014). Hun-
dreds of millions of kina were lost, largely by the 
working class, many of whom withdrew their ‘rainy 
day money’ (typically PGK1000–3000) from their 
bank accounts or the wads of cash hidden around 
the house. These schemes use the money deposited 
by later investors to pay earlier investors, but early 
investors are often part of an ‘inside track’ (Verdery 
1995), with shared political interests. Stories abound 
of ‘high-level’ people winning very large sums of 
money in the early days of the fast money schemes. 
A letter to the Post Courier equated fast money 
schemes and loan sharks: 
Legitimate payouts must not be cancelled
It’s about time someone in authority came out 
and assisted the police, courts and Bank of 
Papua New Guinea take a stance against loan 
sharks and fast money scams. Both types are 
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fraud activities preying on the unsuspecting 
employees both in the public and private 
sector and the churches. Fast money schemes 
get money from the public by false promises 
of large returns and con the bulk of the 
people by making large initial payouts to 
demonstrate their scheme then they fail to 
pay back any money they receive from their 
so-called investors. Many of the money 
scheme operators have made their money 
from the gullible and foolish public and they 
have taken your money and fled (Jafas 2007).
U-Vistract has not been brought to justice and 
is still operating today, using its internet presence 
to defraud American and Australian investors (Cox 
2014b). The longevity of fast money schemes is due 
not to a ‘gullible and foolish public’, but reflects the 
ingenuity of fraudsters who are able to insert their 
scams into popular narratives of how wealth is (or 
should be) produced and accessed (Cox 2011; Cox 
and Macintyre 2014). 
In the way fraudsters groom their victims, 
they play upon widespread aspirations among 
the working class to benefit from the economy by 
managing personal finances as entrepreneurial 
‘investments’. In doing so, they are responding to 
near-ubiquitous ideas of business, investment, and 
economic growth. Where a previous generation of 
salary earners was encouraged to develop their sav-
ings, now formal financial institutions, such as the 
Port Moresby Stock Exchange, are redefining ‘bank 
accounts as unproductive (by comparison with 
investment in shares)’ (Cox 2014c). Indeed, the 
returns on savings accounts in PNG (and beyond) 
are low and certainly provide no encouragement 
for those hoping to supplement their salaries with 
interest payments. As formal institutions fail to 
meet people’s expectations of prosperity, the stage 
is set for unscrupulous informal (now illegal in the 
case of U-Vistract) alternatives to develop. These 
alternatives are often much more accessible, par-
ticularly when they make use of personal contacts 
and social networks such as churches. 
Pyramid Selling Schemes 
If fast money scams are an informal (and deceptive) 
enactment of popular ideas of personal investment, 
then pyramid selling schemes, such as Amway, can 
been seen as an enactment of popular ideas about 
entrepreneurialism and small business. Pyramid 
selling is not an investment scam but a way of 
selling actual goods. Pyramid selling schemes are 
also known as ‘multi-level marketing schemes’ 
or ‘direct marketing schemes’ because the vendor 
sells directly to their social networks. Each vendor 
recruits new ‘downliners’, who then contribute a 
percentage of their sales back to the vendor (hence 
the pyramid analogy). 
This type of scheme is fairly new to Melanesia 
but appeals to many as an option for supplementing 
household income. An example of one suchpyramid 
selling scheme is Pro-Ma Systems — an Australian 
company that sells cosmetics and health products. 
For a time, it was fashionable for young women 
in Port Moresby to buy and sell Pro-Ma beauty 
products from/to each other. However, the demand 
for these costly cosmetics is low and it is unlikely 
that anyone could sustain a livelihood from this type 
of business alone. Like fast money scams, multi-level 
marketing utilises personal networks, and promises 
great wealth without the burden of paid employment 
or subordination to an employer. 
Multi-level marketing schemes are not 
inherently illegal or even fraudulent. They can 
simply be a form of informal selling but one that 
tends to saturate the local market, exceeding 
demand. These schemes promise benefits well in 
excess of their capacity to deliver, and also target 
economically pre-carious people as those most 
likely to be recruited as marketers (Cahn 2006, 
2008). Gewertz and Errington (1999, 56ff.) conclude 
that multi-level marketing schemes perform a 
‘sleight of hand’ — transforming the ‘less fortunate’ 
into entrepreneurial subjects who can be blamed 
for their business failures. Bainton (2011) makes 
a similar case about the self-help course Personal 
Viability (discussed below).
Sometimes, scams adopt the methods of 
pyramid selling schemes. Questnet — a global 
scam operating in PNG and other Pacific islands 
countries — uses multi-level marketing techniques 
and internet merchandising to sell the ‘Bio Disc’ 
— a transparent disc claimed to have healing 
powers. Bio Disc allegedly purifies water, imparting 
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it with properties that will cure almost any 
ailment. Questnet infiltrated the Lae Local Level 
Government, where officials were investigated for 
promoting the scam (The National 14/8/2006). In 
neighbouring Solomon Islands, a senior medical 
specialist has been using his professional standing 
to promote Bio Disc, selling the disc itself and 
bottles of the supposedly purified water (Cox and 
Phillips 2015). In Madang, the scheme seems also 
to have targeted health professionals, and several 
employees of Modillon Hospital there have also 
purchased the disc as downliners. The involvement 
of these salaried professional health workers 
again reflects the common working-class hope of 
supplementing formal but inadequate wages with 
informal ‘business’ activities. 
Personal Viability 
Personal Viability is a PNG self-help course that 
reschools participants in the ways of capitalism, 
promising to make them financially ‘viable’ 
through the cultivation of good personal habits and 
entrepreneurial endeavour. Personal Viability has 
spread widely around PNG and Solomon Islands. 
It has even been adopted by the Lihir Gold Mine’s 
Joint Negotiating Committee as a key element of 
the Lihir Destiny Plan — an action plan for the 
development of the island (Bainton 2010). 
Personal Viability is remarkable for the 
explicitness of its project of remaking economically 
viable selves. Yet, in many ways, it simply mimics 
and applies much of the rhetoric of community 
development programs. Personal Viability does 
encourage its participants to start up their own 
small businesses and even has a microfinance 
program, known as the Grasruts Benk (Grassroots 
Bank). Much of Personal Viability’s ‘grassroots 
entrepreneurship’ is based upon participation in 
microfinance programs, where the disciplines of 
saving and responsible spending are taught with 
the expectation that participants will be able to 
use their savings to generate income from micro-
entrepreneurial activities that will scale up to 
become prosperous businesses with the potential 
to fulfil aspirations for a modern lifestyle. Financial 
literacy is here promoted alongside an ambitious 
risk-taking entrepreneurial spirit that goes well 
beyond saving or husbanding scarce resources, 
and actively cultivates expansive expectations of 
prosperous living. 
Entrepreneurialism as a Sleight of Hand? 
In each of the above examples, the juggling of 
personal finances occurs against a material back-
ground of high costs of living and social demands. 
This drives formal-sector workers into formal and 
even illegal activities. Yet, what is striking about fast 
money schemes, pyramid selling and Personal  
Viability is the prevalence of popular economic 
ideologies of entrepreneurialism — something also 
found in the business-oriented ‘prosperity gospel’  
promoted in many Pentecostal churches (Cox 
2014c; Cox and Macintyre 2014). As middle-class 
salary earners seek to supplement their wages, 
surely these ideologies of business are part of the 
broader cultural context of contemporary PNG. It 
is still an open question as to whether these popular 
visions of entrepreneurialism are simply a ‘sleight 
of hand’, making people more precarious as they 
emphasise individualism and competition.
From Wages to Kai Bars and Meri Blouses: 
Women’s Entrepreneurialism 
For many educated and professional women in 
contemporary PNG, ideologies of entrepreneurial-
ism are not a sleight of hand and do offer viable 
alternatives to formal employment. Indeed, some 
are choosing to leave the relatively secure employ-
ment of the public service to pursue small business 
activities. The willingness of professional women 
to resign from the public service reflects a strong 
‘push factor’ grounded in their experiences of being 
marginalised, harassed and overlooked. At the same 
time, for many women there is a corresponding 
‘pull factor’ as they realise that informal enterprises 
or even larger scale formalised businesses offer as 
much or more money and a greater degree of con-
trol over their working lives. The findings in this 
section are based on ten interviews conducted with 
women entrepreneurs in Goroka, in the Eastern 
Highlands Province of PNG.
Women seek to leave salaried positions  — for 
example, as nurses and teachers  — because they 
are tired of the endemic problems, including multi-
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ple forms of sexism, that characterise employment 
in these contexts, and would prefer to exert their 
energies elsewhere. Women’s experiences of employ-
ment in the public service have often been negative: 
‘female public sector employees are exposed to a 
range of abuses in the workplace, including verbal 
abuse, threats of violence and sexual harassment, as 
well as harassment from the wives and girlfriends of 
male colleagues’ (Zubrinich and Haley 2009, 3). The 
same study found that, ‘[a]lmost without exception, 
women … reported that they feel they work harder 
than their male colleagues and that men at the same 
level get more support from senior management 
and from others at the same level or below’ (ibid., 
15). The bleak experience of women making a liv-
ing in the public sector helps to explain why some 
women resign from salaried roles in order to pursue 
their own enterprises. 
The lure of business for aspiring Papua New 
Guinean women also reflects the different social 
motivations — including autonomy, status, and the 
desire to meet obligations to kin  — that are entan-
gled with enterprise in PNG. In business, profit is 
clearly not the sole objective (Curry 2005; Sharp 
2013a). Although doing business in PNG has been 
foremost a male concern, in Goroka, the capital 
of PNG’s Eastern Highlands, women are simi-
larly embracing enterprise and the opportunities it 
offers, to engage in relationships of obligation and 
reciprocity from a new and seemingly more effica-
cious position. That some professional women are 
resigning from salaried roles to pursue their own 
businesses, and, in some cases, jeopardising their 
family’s economic security, reaffirms that in PNG ‘it 
is the social dimensions of labor that give labor its 
value, and not solely the market value of the work 
performed or the value of the product of that labor’ 
(Curry and Koczberski 2013, 339). 
Between a Wage and a Hard Place
The self-identified ‘business women’ discussed 
below engaged in a mix of activities to earn money, 
support their families, and gain influence in their 
social networks. All drew on capitalist economic 
precepts and notions of self-advancement, but they 
did so in fundamentally precarious circumstances, 
as the following case study demonstrates. 
‘Virginia’ is a former secretary and the mother 
of five children. She lives in a village outside Goro-
ka with her husband. Virginia worked in banks for 
19 years before resigning in 2000 in order to con-
test the 2002 elections. Unlike the salaried women 
in the public service, many of whom leave because 
of dissatisfaction with how they are treated, Virgin-
ia’s political aspirations suggest the pull factors for 
women seeking other potential benefits outside the 
workforce, including the prospect of gaining politi-
cal power. However, like the majority of female 
political candidates in PNG, Virginia was not 
elected and has since supported herself via a range 
of enterprises, some more successful than others. 
Over the last 12 years, Virginia has sewn and sold 
meri blouses (women’s blouses akin to other loose 
tops worn in various parts of the Pacific), raised 
poultry, marketed excess garden produce, and 
picked and produced coffee. 
Between 2010 and 2012, Virginia ran a suc-
cessful kai bar (fast food shop) in Goroka. Virginia 
also produced lunch and dinner packs for visi-
tors at the nearby lodge, and made and delivered 
lunches to employees at various large organisations, 
including the two banks where she used to work. 
Her business was flourishing when the landlord 
asked Virginia to leave, despite the fact she had a 
tenancy agreement. It seems Virginia’s kai bar was 
undermining the sales of the landlord’s son, who 
sold snacks nearby. Since the closure of her fast 
food shop, she has been buying bales of second-
hand clothes to sell to people in the village. Virginia 
hopes to open another kai bar in town but has lost 
confidence as a result of the eviction. While she 
has the tenacity and spousal support to continue, 
Virginia’s experiences with the kai bar illustrate 
the precarity of the economic and social context in 
which she is striving to establish herself.
Supplementing Salaries
To manage the risks while establishing an enter-
prise, other women have held onto waged positions. 
‘Naomi’, a 52 year-old nurse, provides an example 
of another pull factor for women  — namely the 
prospect that they can earn more money through 
establishing successful businesses than they can in 
the public service. Having left school at the end of 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 9 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2015/2
year 10, Naomi attended Lae Nursing School before 
returning to Goroka to work in the hospital where 
she has worked for almost 30 years. Like other 
waged people living in PNG’s towns, Naomi says the 
money is not enough to live on and that she feels 
she can earn more as a business woman. She said: 
‘if I sit back and wait for my fortnight pay it will not 
help me’. To cover the costs of living, Naomi began 
sewing meri blouses to earn some extra money. 
Attending a training course on running a business, 
she says ‘gave me the boldness [to] become a busi-
ness woman’. Naomi makes her meri blouses after 
her shifts at the hospital and on her two days a week 
off. In the week Spark spoke with her she had sold 
ten blouses at PGK50 (about AU$20) each. In com-
parison, she earns PGK600 a fortnight as a nurse 
once deductions are accounted for. Supplementing 
inadequate wages in such ways is widespread — this 
is demonstrated in a recent review of service deliv-
ery in PNG, which found that 19 per cent of health 
workers and 39 per cent of teachers in Port Mores-
by, for example, reported having an alternative 
source of income (Howes et al. 2014, 51 and 73). 
Naomi says she would like to leave her job as 
a nurse and expand her tailoring business. But 
her husband and son, who rely on her salary, have 
been unwilling to support this transition, indicat-
ing either a lack of confidence in her as an entre-
preneur, the economic environment, or both. Male 
support is often central to the success of enterpris-
ing women in the highlands of PNG. Nevertheless, 
Naomi intends to resign and focus on her tailoring 
business once she has paid off her son’s bride price. 
In weighing up her decision about when to leave 
her job as a nurse, Naomi is taking both economic 
and social factors into consideration. 
‘I Want to Eat Steak’: Aspiration and Motivation
‘Susannah’, also a tailor, has made this next step, 
giving up paid work as an accounts manager with 
a construction company to pursue sewing, which 
had been her ‘hobby’. Separated from her husband 
for 20 years, Susannah had long been responsible 
for meeting her own needs, and those of her five 
children. Like Naomi, she was earning more from 
her sewing than she was receiving from her salary, 
saying: ‘I got more [from sewing] than what I earn 
in a fortnight’. As with Naomi, the prospect of hav-
ing a greater income, rather than frustrations with 
her job, was the most significant factor in Susan-
nah’s decision. When she saw that she was making 
good money from her sewing, she decided to leave 
her role in order to expand the business. As she 
expressed it:
If [other] people can eat steak and I can 
[only] eat tinned fish, I want to eat steak too 
you know. It has really motivated me to be 
strong and so I made up my mind in 2002 
that when I quit my job, I’m going to start 
something, I’m going to do something for 
myself.
Susannah’s comments capture the experiences 
and aspirations of women who perceive their sala-
ried positions to be holding them back from realis-
ing the full financial benefits of their enterprises. 
While not all the women interviewed fitted into 
this category, those who did had taken considerable 
risks, leaving secure, salaried positions to ‘go out’ 
on their own. 
They include ‘Ruth’ and ‘Lucy’, both of whom 
had left salaried positions and invested everything 
in their businesses. Both women, partly motivated 
by injustice they had experienced in their formal 
employment, had left their paid roles to pursue 
their passions. For Ruth, this was cooking. Like 
Susannah, who commenced her sewing business 
while still in her paid role, Ruth was making food 
to sell at the local markets and in schools dur-
ing the period in which she was employed in the 
Eastern Highlands Provincial Administration. She 
would produce the food in the morning before 
work and then send it around town in the ‘little 
taxi’ her husband bought her in order to support 
the business. Her food production soon expanded 
to include a mobile catering service. During this 
period, Ruth saved money that she later used to set 
up her restaurant, now a successful enterprise in 
Goroka.
Lucy’s dream was to set up a consultancy to 
assist people to start their own businesses. Unsure 
this would generate enough income to support her 
family, she established a fast food company at the 
same time in order to support the consultancy. 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm10                                                                                                                          State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
T. Sharp, J. Cox, C. Spark, S. Lusby, & M. Rooney
People would not come every day to get my 
[consultancy] services and sometimes we 
would get dry so I thought having a fast food 
[business] and catering for people every day 
could give me a little money every day.
At the time of interview, Lucy was employing 
16 people in the fast food company as well as 
running her consultancy. She is also a mother and 
engaged in multi-level marketing selling sanitary 
pads. Lucy sees PNG as ‘a world of opportunities’, 
and wants to ensure that local people are equipped 
and encouraged to make the most of these. At the 
moment, she feels ‘a lot of entrepreneurs from 
outside have seen that opportunity so they are 
here doing businesses’ but soon ‘with LNG and 
all these things coming up, women will have to 
take their rightful places’. For example, Lucy says 
she would like to establish a car hire company, 
and a resource centre that could be rented out 
for use as a workshop and training venue. Lucy’s 
proposed ventures indicate her awareness of the 
kinds of services and facilities required by external 
companies and agencies. Her sense that women 
should ‘take their rightful place’ in managing these 
reflects both local resentment about the money-
making opportunities that are taken up by outsiders 
and the influence of global aid and human rights 
discourses on women’s economic endeavours.
Overwhelmingly, entrepreneurial women are 
driven by the desire to support their families, 
including helping with the cost of school fees, 
contributions to bride price, and big events such 
as weddings and funerals. In doing so, they are 
drawing precisely on their capacities in more 
conventional female roles, namely as mothers and 
household managers, to extend their influence in 
the economic sphere (Spark and Meki 2014). But 
their contribution to these dimensions of social 
life also enables women to expand their influence 
into realms previously dominated by men. By 
employing family members, making decisions 
about the direction of their businesses, and sharing 
the income generated from these businesses, they 
are gaining a degree of prestige and influence that 
has previously eluded women in the highlands 
(cf. Curry and Koczberski 2013; Sharp 2013a). No 
longer meri nating (just a woman), some become 
women of substance in the eyes of their husbands 
and others. The entangling of economic activities 
with wider social concerns in PNG is not a new 
observation. Nevertheless, understanding this 
entanglement is critical given the current emphasis 
in Australian aid policy on economic development 
and the role of the private sector. 
Navigating Formal Employment and Informal 
Housing in Port Moresby 
Just as women may choose to leave wage employ-
ment in the public service to seek out entre-
preneurial activities, the livelihood strategies of 
residents of informal or illegal urban settlements 
reflect responses to securing a ‘material basis for 
their non-capitalistic lives’ (McCormack and Bar-
clay 2013, 6). Settlements have been a historical fea-
ture of development in PNG, generally tolerated by 
urban authorities (Goddard 2005; Oram 1976). In 
recent years, however, the growth of Port Moresby’s 
population, accompanied by a property boom and 
the increased cost of living, associated with the 
extractive resources boom, has meant that many 
residents of the city (and other urban centres in 
PNG) can no longer afford formal rented or mort-
gaged housing in the suburbs and are choosing 
instead to move into informal settlements. 
Historically, the settlements were considered 
transition zones for new migrants to the city 
who would eventually move on, but today, the 
settlements are very much permanent fixtures with 
long-term residents. For newer settlement dwellers, 
the pressure of high housing costs and the cost 
of social obligations to kin mean they must 
make choices that balance their material needs 
(including for shelter) and social aspirations with 
tenuous housing and land tenure arrangements 
and the potential personal insecurity of settlement 
dwelling. Life in the city is becoming increasingly 
precarious for many, but some develop ingenious 
strategies that interconnect diverse economic 
activities, that include the formal and the informal, 
and that are equally embedded in local and 
indigenous economic and social systems of value 
(Curry and Koczberski 2013; McCormack and 
Barclay 2013). 
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For most Port Moresby residents, progress 
towards social and material gain is tempered by 
the costs of security and housing. To redress these 
imbalances, people seek out alternative options for 
land and housing, including in the settlements. For 
an increasing number of Papua New Guineans, the 
settlements are not a place of crime and poverty but 
simply somewhere that enables them to manage the 
debilitating expenses of urban life. 
Throughout Melanesia, migrant settlers and 
customary landowners have frequently entered 
into mutually acceptable and beneficial land 
arrangements that foreground Melanesian forms 
of exchange and social relations (Allen 2012; Koc-
zberski and Curry 2009; Numbasa and Koczberski 
2012). However, in urban settings, land has long 
been transacted as a commodity, exchanged on the 
market through normative legal frameworks, and 
alienated from customary land tenure regimes. 
In this context, customary land owners are often 
excluded from the benefits of urban develop-
ment (Kidu 2002; Nolan and Abani 2002). At the 
same time, more and more people are moving into 
urban centres to be closer to health, education, and 
employment and income-earning opportunities, 
but have difficulty finding affordable housing, even 
if they are on reasonable wages. In the face of these 
complexities around land in the urban milieu, peo-
ple’s land and housing strategies demonstrate con-
siderable resourcefulness. 
This is evident in the lives of residents in the 
‘ATS’ settlement in Port Moresby. ‘ATS’ is named 
for its geographic location adjacent to the Air 
Transport Squadron residential compound. It is 
also referred to as ‘Oro’ or ‘Popondetta’ settlement 
— reflecting its history as a home for people from 
Oro Province (capital Popondetta) who collectively 
negotiated land access with customary landown-
ers and the state. ATS residents acknowledge that 
they do not own the land. Their occupation of land 
is often viewed as illegal or informal, both in refer-
ence to pre-existing customary landowner claims 
and to the state or private leaseholder claims over 
land. In response, Oro people living in ATS settle-
ment have engaged collectively (including by form-
ing associations) and individually with customary 
landowners, the state, and property developers, 
seeking alternative options for land and housing. 
While pursuing their development aspirations, 
people situate themselves within the collective 
Oro ‘ethno-territorial’ identity, which is important 
for accessing and maintaining land and ensuring 
security (see Koczberski and Curry 2004, 362–63). 
Inclusion in the settlement also rests on ongoing 
social engagement with the community, as shown 
in the following three accounts of the lives of ATS 
residents.
Downward Mobility or Smart Living?
The urban middle classes, positioned between for-
mal employment and their social obligations, may 
choose to live in informal housing arrangements 
that enable them to keep both work and kin. This 
can be seen in the story of Matthew, a senior public 
servant who lives in ATS settlement. His salary is 
higher than most in the settlement. However, if he 
chose to rent a house in the city he would be left 
with barely enough to meet all the commitments 
he has towards his and his family’s aspirations for 
development. As a leader in his family, and in his 
community in Oro Province, he has numerous 
obligations to support kin, participate in exchange 
ceremonies, including with his wife’s family, as well 
as his own political aspirations. He is also com-
mitted to paying his daughter’s tuition fees at the 
University of Papua New Guinea  — her education 
represents the family’s future material and social 
status. By living in the settlement he is able to save 
on rent and keep up with these commitments. He 
is also able to assist several neighbours and family 
members residing in the settlement, and to support 
collective efforts to fight an eviction notice they are 
facing from a property developer.
Social Progress and Mobility while Keeping 
Grounded
Many families adopt collective strategies for gen-
erating income, sharing accommodation and car-
ing for children or elderly relatives. These draw on 
social networks that typically stretch across multi-
ple households and span both formal and informal 
land and housing arrangements, as is evident in the 
following example.
‘Cristel’, a widow with eight children, moved 
into ATS over 10 years ago due to a lack of housing. 
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She is a casual worker on a low income in one of 
Port Moresby’s international hotels. One of her 
sons, ‘Cliff ’, is a teacher in a Port Moresby school 
and rents a small flat in the city with his wife 
and daughter. Her other son, ‘Ron’, is married, 
works with a company in Port Moresby, and has 
recently built his own home of offcut timber 
next to Cristel’s house. Ron’s wife sells betel nut 
near their house. Three of Cristel’s children are 
attending school in Port Moresby, and Cliff ’s 
house is an alternative home for them. They stay 
with him and attend school when Cristel’s pay 
runs out. Cliff and Ron also assist Cristel at times 
with money to buy food. While Cliff ’s residency 
in formal, rented housing is a testimony to his 
social progress, Cristel anticipates that one day he 
might need to build a house in the settlement, and 
has identified land nearby for him. In this way, 
Cristel’s family straddles the formal housing sectors 
of Port Moresby and the settlement. Like many 
other urban families, Cristel and her sons aspire to 
individual social and material ‘development’, but 
they approach their goals for life, land, housing, 
incomes and livelihoods through their connections 
in extended households (cf. Monsell-Davis 1993). 
Residing in such extra-legal residential and 
land arrangements in Port Moresby has its risks. 
Tenure over land is tenuous, as evidenced in media 
reports of settlement evictions (Ovasuru 2013; Say-
ama and Wapar 2013), and security is often man-
aged locally in the absence of state institutions 
such as the police. With further economic growth 
predicted (and with upcoming international events 
such as the 2015 South Pacific games and the 2018 
APEC meeting both in Port Moresby), these evic-
tions are likely to continue. This is in spite of recent 
announcements by the capital’s governor to con-
vert settlements into ‘suburbs’ (Parkop 2013; The 
National 2014). Yet the benefits of low-cost housing 
and security bolstered by living among kin or an 
ethnically defined group outweigh these costs and 
offer urban residents a way to navigate the chal-
lenges of contemporary urban life. 
Diversified Investment 
People draw on and maintain networks that reach 
beyond the urban environment and extend back 
to their home provinces. As ATS residents attempt 
to mitigate the precarity of their land tenure, some 
aspire to make investments in which their land and 
livelihood options span the urban–rural divide. 
Reflecting some of the contemporary transforma-
tions of urban–rural connections, the following 
example highlights the relationships that townsfolk 
maintain with those in their home provinces. Sig-
nificantly, these relationships are translating into 
new strategies for economic security. 
Lina moved into ATS as a child with her 
parents, who both come from Oro Province. She 
has always lived in town and her visits ‘home’ to 
Oro have been infrequent. She is now married to 
a man from another province and has four young 
children. Her husband works with a company in 
Port Moresby while she sells a variety of goods, 
including betel nut, in front of their home. Lina’s 
sister has bought land from customary landowners 
near Popondetta — the urban centre of Oro 
Province. Lina and her husband have saved some 
money and are planning to buy a block of land near 
Popondetta, from customary landowners through 
her sister’s network, although such arrangements 
have their own insecurities (Koczberski and Curry 
2004). Lina has been told that the land will cost 
around PGK10,000, and she feels that she will soon 
be able to afford this. Lina hopes that this will 
diversify her livelihood as she plans to invest in oil 
palm production. 
Despite her rich social connections in ATS, 
Lina also recognises that the precarity of her posi-
tion in the settlement is likely to be ongoing. 
Unlike Cristel, whose aspirations for the future are 
pinned to her children’s education and their gain-
ing a foothold in the formal economy, Lina follows 
her sister’s example and looks back to her ‘home’ 
province as a place where she may find a better life 
for herself. What she is able to save from her fam-
ily’s urban (formal and informal) livelihoods now 
becomes the basis for a future investment in a more 
prosperous future elsewhere.
The stories above show people pragmatically 
navigating the precarity of urban life, through 
particular housing choices. In some cases, people 
forego the security of formal tenure in favour of 
lower cost informal accommodation or a more 
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supportive social milieu. While pursuing individ-
ual aspirations, residents situate themselves in the 
collective security of kin and common identity. 
In the same way that they manoeuvre between 
the formal and informal housing divide, they also 
manoeuvre between different income-earning 
activities. The stories recounted here emphasise 
that social relationships continue to be critically 
important in shaping the livelihood strategies of 
urban residents (Strathern 1975).
The ‘Green Gold’ of the ‘Grassroots’
Throughout PNG, the trade in betel nut is the most 
visible manifestation of a flourishing ‘informal’ 
economy. This legal stimulant, which is consumed 
widely throughout PNG, is widely considered the 
‘green gold’ of the grassroots (Sharp 2013a). The 
sale of betel nut, which evades taxation,4 is among 
the most important livelihood activities for Papua 
New Guineans, contributing to the incomes of 
around a third of rural households and a quarter of 
urban households (NSO 2003). Betel nut features 
prominently in everyday imaginings of the econ-
omy in which the majority of Papua New Guin-
eans are engaged  — that diverse raft of economic 
activities that, in one seller’s reframing, sustains the 
country’s grassroots ‘13 days a fortnight’. Highly vis-
ible and valued by those whose lives it pervades, the 
sale of betel nut is, nevertheless, hidden and muted 
or even demonised in typical renderings of the 
national economy that foreground resource extrac-
tion, exports and ‘formalised’ wage employment. 
This disconnect is apparent in the differential 
representation of the extractive resource boom, 
fronted by the PNG LNG project, and the betel 
nut trade in Port Moresby. Despite the fact that it 
pushes up the cost of living for ordinary people, 
in newspaper headlines and government reports 
the resource boom has come to define the national 
economy. Meanwhile, the betel nut trade, which 
sustains so many households and distributes money 
far more equitably, has come under an impassioned 
attack from local government due to health and 
aesthetic concerns (see Sharp 2013b). The betel nut 
trade highlights the interconnections and circula-
tions in the country’s ‘economic’ spaces, conduits 
that problematise neat categorisations of rural and 
urban, formal and informal, grassroots and elite, 
licit and illicit.
The betel trade is an indigenous innovation 
based on an indigenous crop, driven by indigenous 
demand, but it clearly does not exist in isolation 
from the national and international economies. 
Those in the trade routinely frame it in relation 
to other parts of the national economy  — people 
chew more betel nut on the fortnightly payday and, 
in the highlands, during the seasonal coffee flush 
when they have more money (cf. Allen et al. 2009, 
313; McGregor and Bourke 2009, 282).
Betel nut has taken on seemingly contradictory 
narratives. It has strong overtones of wealth and 
money — something captured by the ‘green gold’ 
label — but at the same time its sale defines the 
grassroots, and carries something of a stigma for 
those who trade it. The promise of betel nut is its 
malleability as a commodity. That it can be viably 
sold at virtually any scale, from a handful of nuts 
to several hundred bags, means that there are few 
economic barriers to entry, and it is this that can 
make it the stuff of rags to riches. As such, betel 
nut provides yet another domain of aspiration, 
like other forms of business or their counterfeits 
discussed above.
From a ‘One-Day Fortnight’ to Rice and Tinned Fish
‘Betel people’3 — those involved in betel nut’s pro-
duction, exchange and distribution — often favoura-
bly contrast their work to that of wage employment. 
Like the entrepreneurial women above, many of the 
traders Sharp spoke with had previously received a 
wage as teachers, policemen, and agricultural offic-
ers, but had left the security of paid employment for 
the higher returns of betel nut. One of Hagen’s larg-
est traders, ‘Lewis’, had previously been employed in 
the coffee industry. He explained:
When I was employed ... because I was a 
casual or something ... they were paying me 
about K150 per fortnight. That’s not much. 
Then I compared [it] to betel nut ... my annu-
al salary could be taken in a week or two. 
Another common sentiment expressed by betel 
nut sellers is that while those in waged employment 
have to wait for the fortnightly payday, betel nut 
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sellers always have money. Another successful betel 
nut trader, ‘Margret’, explained why her husband 
left wage employment as a teacher:
We saw that with teaching we would wait for 
the payday for money ... each fortnight we 
would get K300 or K400–500. With betel nut 
and betel pepper we have money every day … 
some thousands. We carry cash around. We 
go to sleep and wake up with money. 
While it can certainly be lucrative, the trade 
is also very risky. Stories abound of traders who 
have made their fortunes and purchased a vehicle 
from the profits of a single buying trip, and of those 
who have lost everything, including their lives. For 
most people in the trade, however, betel nut pro-
vides a more modest income that is used to pay for 
daily living expenses and school fees. Although the 
‘one day fortnight’ (earning in a single day what 
one would normally earn in a fortnight in wage 
employment) is unattainable for most, many betel 
nut sellers do earn incomes on par with those in 
low-level wage employment (Umezaki and Ohtsuka 
2003; Anderson 2008).
For some, betel nut earnings replace and dis-
place other forms of income. However, it is more 
common for betel nut selling to supplement other 
income-earning activities, including wage employ-
ment as the above stories of women entrepreneurs 
and residents of the urban settlements attest. This 
may involve different members of a household or 
the wage earner themselves. One young roadside 
betel nut seller in Mount Hagen worked each day as 
the caretaker for a local church. In the early morn-
ings and afternoons, he sold betel nut to passers-
by heading to work for the day. The money he 
received from this regularly exceeded what he was 
paid by the church. Nevertheless, he valued both 
incomes, as his wage gave him security and his 
association with the church provided a fence in the 
urban area behind which he could sell (cf. Williams 
and Round 2007). Many wage earners also trade 
betel nut during their annual leave or even when 
they are meant to be on duty, as one police officer 
confessed.5 Such examples demonstrate that betel 
nut selling is not just an occupation of the impover-
ished, as it is so often construed, but a form of live-
lihood adopted by a wide range of households with 
diverse socioeconomic circumstances.
While the largest traders are able to make sub-
stantial profits and many marketplace vendors 
make a reasonable living, many smaller street sell-
ers are in a very different position, often one of 
precarity. For example, ‘David’ left his home area in 
Simbu Province due to fighting in the early 2000s 
and now lives in one of Goroka’s informal settle-
ments. Here he and his wife eke out a living, largely 
by selling betel nut. Without enough money to 
pay the marketplace gate fees, he lives a precarious 
existence selling illegally on the roadside, where he 
is regularly harassed by police. The government has 
‘eaten’ lots of his money in bail charges, he says. His 
story is one of resilience but not necessarily success. 
We live on this ... every day we must go to 
the marketplace, buy betel nut and come and 
sell. When finished we make a small K1 or K2 
profit which we use to buy the night’s meal. 
Tomorrow with K10 or thereabouts we go 
and buy again, sell again. We make K1 or K2 
profit and we eat again ... We don’t make lots 
of profit ... If we make K5 we will buy rice and 
tinned fish at night. We will eat and sleep. If 
not, we will just sleep. We won’t have food in 
the house. We will go to sleep hungry. Recent 
attempts to ban the sale of betel nut in Port 
Moresby have only heightened the precarity of 
many urban livelihoods. For people like David, 
depictions of economic informality as ‘getting 
by’ are apt (see Conroy 2010), but this under-
sells the vibrancy and opportunity which so 
many Papua New Guineans find in the trade.
Betel people often discussed the trade’s role in 
the circulation and redistribution of wealth — and of 
betel nut’s capacity to travel to those ‘money places’, 
associated with large-scale resource extraction, enab-
ling them to return with money for the grassroots. 
Thus in people’s minds at least, the betel nut trade 
becomes a mechanism by which some of the great 
wealth that flows into the country  — and so readily 
evaporates  — may be captured by those Papua New 
Guineans who do not happen, by geological chance, 
to have a resource project, or possess engineering 
degrees. 
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In the late afternoon and on the weekends, those 
who have employment in town will often come to 
the betel nut marketplace. These people are con-
spicuous by the way they carry themselves and the 
shoes they wear. When asked his thoughts, a betel 
nut trader said: 
He walks around like he is a big [important] 
man, what for? I think he must be thinking of 
his education or his office work. But our main 
thought is that he is no match for us in terms 
of money, we make money every day. 
Betel nut work is typically cast as ‘something of 
the grassroots’ and is often referred to disparagingly 
as ‘rubbish work’ yet, as the trader above suggests, 
this is in contradiction with the money to be made, 
at least by some. By a different measure, those 
higher earning betel people perceive themselves as 
equals or even superior to those in wage employ-
ment. One seller recounts:
Those employed — public servants and work-
ers — they work but they don’t have money. 
When their money is finished they come to 
us. They say, ‘Let’s find the betel nut and betel 
pepper sellers and get some of their money.’
There is some satisfaction in having a wage 
earner come to you as a lowly betel nut trader or 
vendor to borrow money, reflecting the emerging 
class distinctions in PNG (Gewertz and Errington 
1999). Betel people are also able to demonstrate 
their efficacy in the contexts of bride price and 
compensation payments by contributing as 
much as, or perhaps more generously than, their 
employed counterparts. At the same time that 
betel nut traders and vendors assert themselves 
as commensurate with educated people and wage 
earners, they also reinforce that they remain 
fundamentally grassroots. Although trading betel 
nut has emerged as a new arena of competition 
between men in Hagen, few traders see themselves 
attaining any significant social status through 
trading betel nut per se (Sharp 2013a). ‘I have no 
education; I just stayed at home ... If through my 
betel nut work I get a car, still no one will take note 
of me … I am a villager, I am grassroots. I have a 
car, I have a house, everything, except I do not get 
recognition’, expressed one trader.6 
The potential profits from selling betel nut 
have drawn some wage earners and businessmen 
into trying their hand at betel nut trading, and the 
development of such a trend warrants attention. 
However, though there is considerable lure in a one 
day fortnight brought by green gold, today’s betel 
nut sellers do not want their children to become 
tomorrow’s betel nut sellers. Despite the evident 
monetary rewards, the betel nut trade is something 
that one becomes involved in because there are few 
other viable and rewarding livelihood opportunities 
available. Most people want something better for 
their children. Somewhat paradoxically, the aspira-
tions parents have for their children is a waged job 
and a life in town. One trader remarked on his situ-
ation and that of many others like him:
Our parents did not put us through school, so 
we just stayed at home and got into this betel 
nut work. Now I do not want my children to 
do the same ... So I must trade in betel nut, 
pay their school fees. They must go to school 
and live in town. 
Such comments make clear that their desire 
is for well-paid government and private sector 
employment and modern Western-style houses, 
not the urban minimum wage and a life in the 
settlements. Thus, while betel nut is alluring, 
incomes can be highly variable, and there is also 
the pervasive knowledge that betel nut trading is 
risky business. Fragmented transport networks and 
fluctuating prices make the trade financially risky, 
and many traders have died on leaky boats and 
dangerous roads in search of green gold. Vendors 
are also acutely aware that betel nut marketplaces 
are dirty and unhealthy places where people 
become ill. No-one wants this for their children. 
Conclusion
The case studies presented in this paper have drawn 
attention to the strategies that Papua New Guineans 
are deploying as they attempt to manage precarious 
situations. These are not always successful: pyramid 
schemes, for example, are maladaptive and further 
exploit their victims; small businesses often strug-
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gle to remain financially viable,  although, as noted, 
turning a profit is not the sole objective of many 
enterprises. Diverse livelihoods that encompass 
both wage and informal economic activities can 
and frequently do contribute to a household’s eco-
nomic security, but this is not always the case, as is 
made evident in our account of the roster-imposed 
precarity of security guards. 
Participation in the formal economy is a promi-
nent aspiration; nevertheless, alternatives or addi-
tions to the formal system are frequently sought. 
As we have shown, this includes those in waged 
employment receiving inadequate remuneration 
(below a living wage), those excluded from or 
disenchanted with the main banks, the underem-
ployed, and the victims of gendered discrimination 
in the workplace. For some, a wage (and perhaps its 
accompanying uniform) may offer more in terms 
of social standing and legitimacy than economic 
return. Informal economic activities may also 
make viable a household’s participation in formal 
employment by supplementing wages that are lower 
than the social obligations that accompany them, 
or by providing money to the household while it 
waits for payday. The livelihood strategies we docu-
ment reflect diverse and competing considerations 
and trade-offs in people’s lives, the acceptance of 
different forms of risk, and manoeuvring to exploit 
opportunities.
One key implication of our research, which 
some PNG Government authorities already recog-
nise, is that informal economic activity should be 
revalued and seen as a ‘full and legitimate partner 
of the formal economy’ (DCDINA 2011, ix; Conroy 
2010). This is not simply a matter of accepting the 
informal economy as a safety net, but recognising 
its value as an expression of the creativity and resil-
ience of the many Papua New Guineans living in 
precarious economic situations. It is clear that, as a 
whole, those dependent on informal livelihoods are 
more likely to suffer severe poverty (Gibson 2013). 
Informality should not be romanticised — this 
would be unjust to the urban poor in the same way 
that ideas of ‘subsistence affluence’ are unjust to 
their rural counterparts — but should be valued.
Formalising informal activities may not always 
be desirable. This is particularly pertinent in light 
of the challenges faced by the state in PNG. Greater 
legal protection and rights regarding working con-
ditions and contract assurances have the potential 
to be beneficial, but licensing arrangements that 
focus on regulation and control and offer little 
benefit to informal operators are likely to inhibit 
people’s ability to secure a livelihood. Some level of 
regulation of informal enterprise is desirable — for 
example, to ensure minimum food hygiene stand-
ards are met in the interests of public health. How-
ever, experience in PNG has shown that efforts to 
regulate aspects of informality, whether street ven-
dors or the residents of the urban settlements, have 
frequently been heavy-handed. 
Understanding the interactions of the formal, 
the informal, and the precarious is necessary for 
considering how the economic growth currently 
being driven by the resource sector may be distrib-
uted more equitably and contribute to more inclu-
sive human development (UNDP 2014). Policy 
interventions would do well to consider the ways in 
which informality and formality heighten or reduce 
the precarity in people’s lives. Shifting policy atten-
tion towards the goal of managing precarity may 
lead to renewed attention to essential services such 
as clean water, improved sanitation, basic health 
services and quality education. 
In our exploration of urban livelihoods in PNG, 
formality and informality have emerged as impor-
tant reference points for understanding people’s 
aspirations and their responses to economic precar-
ity. Today, precarity characterises the experience 
of many urban Papua New Guineans, whether in 
formal employment or business, or earning a liv-
ing through informal economic activities. For many 
Papua New Guineans, there is a disappointing gap 
between their aspirations for prosperity and their 
daily experiences of making a living. Employment 
opportunities have failed to keep pace with school 
and tertiary graduates, and the resource boom 
has done little to meet the needs of the burgeon-
ing youth population. The pyramid has become 
increasingly difficult to ascend.
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Endnotes
1    Tim Sharp’s research on the highlands betel nut trade 
in PNG involved 13 months’ fieldwork undertaken in 
2006, 2007 and 2010. This multi-sited ethnography 
involved fieldwork in 12 provinces. John Cox’s 
multi-sited research on fast money schemes in PNG 
involved field research in 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
Ceridwen Spark’s research is based on interviews with 
women entrepreneurs in Goroka in May 2012 and 
September 2013. Stephanie Lusby’s research in the 
security industry was part of 14 months’ fieldwork 
in East New Britain investigating men’s engagement 
with anti-violence against women campaign messages 
and HIV prevention campaigns. Michelle Rooney’s 
research on urban livelihood strategies draws on 
long-term residence in Port Moresby and fieldwork 
that was carried out over a six-month period in 2013 
in the Oro-ATS settlement of Port Moresby. For all 
the authors, the research presented here is part of 
a longer term professional, academic and personal 
engagement with PNG.
2 Names of people and organisations are pseudonyms 
throughout this paper. 
3 That betel nut sales evade tax reflects both the low 
incomes associated with most betel nut sellers and the 
inability of the state to identify and tax those higher 
grossing betel nut sellers.
4 Our use of ‘betel people’ is translated from the 
Tok Pisin Buai na daka lain, which literally means 
‘betel nut and betel pepper people/group’. The term 
‘betel people’ has been used with different meaning 
elsewhere (see Rivers 1914; Riesenfeld 1947).
5 Gibson (2013) notes that individuals having multiple 
income sources is less common in Port Moresby than 
in other urban centres, although diversification at the 
household level is not analysed.
6 See Sharp (2013a) for a discussion of the way in 
which betel nut trading, and enterprise in PNG 
more broadly, has been entangled with endogenous 
concerns around social status (also see Curry 2005).
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